MiCA Stablecoin Deadline 2027: What CASPs Must Do After ESMA’s New Opinion on Non-Compliant ARTs and EMTs

ESMA has materially tightened its supervisory position on non-MiCA-compliant stablecoins. For crypto-asset service providers, the issue is no longer confined to listing or actively marketing such tokens. Exchanges, custodians, transfer providers and other CASPs should now review whether any part of their service architecture permits clients to obtain, increase or maintain exposure to non-compliant asset-referenced tokens or e-money tokens, with legacy positions expected to be remediated by 8 January 2027.

2026

Josef Bergt

The European Securities and Markets Authority published a significant Opinion on 8 October 2026 concerning crypto-asset services relating to asset-referenced tokens, or ARTs, and e-money tokens, or EMTs, which do not satisfy the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets, generally referred to as MiCA or MiCAR.

Although the document is formally an Opinion addressed to national competent authorities and therefore should not be confused with an amendment to MiCAR itself, its practical importance is substantial. ESMA's position is that an authorised crypto-asset service provider should, as a matter of principle, no longer provide MiCAR services relating to an ART or EMT whose lawful offer to the public or admission to trading does not meet the requirements imposed by Titles III or IV of MiCAR. ESMA derives this broader supervisory approach particularly from the general obligation in Article 66(1) MiCAR for a CASP to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients.

For Liechtenstein market participants, this is not merely an EU regulatory development to be observed from a distance. On 23 October 2026, the Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein expressly announced that it will take the ESMA Opinion into account in its supervisory practice. The FMA also expressly identifies 8 January 2027 as the latest date by which remaining legacy holdings should be remediated.

The result is an immediate compliance question for CASPs, token issuers and businesses whose products rely upon stablecoin settlement infrastructure. A stablecoin that cannot lawfully be made available under the MiCAR framework may increasingly become commercially unusable within regulated European distribution channels even where the CASP itself is fully authorised.

The decisive change: the issue is no longer merely whether the CASP is itself offering the stablecoin

The regulatory history is important because it shows how significantly the supervisory position has developed.

The European Commission's January 2025 Q&A and ESMA's accompanying statement focused heavily upon whether particular CASP activities could themselves amount to an offer to the public, an admission to trading or a placing of an ART or EMT. An operator that independently listed an unauthorised ART or EMT on a trading platform could, for example, be regarded as seeking its admission to trading. Exchange, execution or order transmission activities could likewise amount to an offer where the CASP actively promoted the token. ESMA expected compliance with that earlier interpretation by the end of the first quarter of 2025. (European Commission, 2025; ESMA, 2025).

The October 2026 Opinion goes considerably further.

ESMA expressly states that its new analysis does not depend on treating every individual CASP service as an offer to the public or admission to trading. Instead, ESMA moves the analysis to the obligations imposed upon the authorised CASP itself and asks whether its services, considered individually or in combination, maintain or facilitate the availability of a non-compliant ART or EMT.

That conceptual shift matters. A CASP can therefore face a supervisory issue even where its particular activity would not, standing alone, constitute the issuance, offer or admission to trading of the stablecoin.

ESMA's reasoning is that clients dealing with a non-compliant ART or EMT are exposed to risks arising not principally from the quality of the CASP's own service, but from the absence of the issuer-level safeguards which MiCAR requires for ARTs and EMTs. Since the CASP cannot reproduce those safeguards through its own risk management, ESMA considers that the provision of MiCAR services concerning such tokens presumptively conflicts with the Article 66(1) obligation to act in clients' best interests.

This is therefore much more than a delisting question.

What is a “non-MiCA-compliant” stablecoin?

The terminology must be approached carefully. The Opinion does not establish a generic prohibition on foreign stablecoins, nor does the mere fact that a token was originally issued outside the EEA automatically answer the compliance question.

For purposes of the Opinion, ESMA describes non-MiCA-compliant ARTs or EMTs as tokens for which the conditions governing a lawful public offer or admission to trading under Titles III or IV of MiCAR are not satisfied, taking account also of applicable exemptions and transitional arrangements.

The analysis is therefore token-specific and fact-sensitive.

For an ART, this requires examination of the Title III regime and the status of the relevant issuer, including whether the applicable authorisation and issuance requirements have been satisfied. For an EMT, Title IV becomes decisive and, under Article 48 MiCAR, the regulatory architecture is linked to the issuer holding the status required for issuing electronic money. A CASP should consequently not rely merely upon a token's commercial description, its market capitalisation, the identity of the network on which it circulates, or the fact that other platforms continue to support it.

The compliance question must be legally documented.

This point is particularly important for global stablecoins which may technically circulate without geographical limitation. Blockchain accessibility and regulatory availability are different concepts. The fact that a token continues to exist on-chain does not mean that an authorised European CASP can make the full range of its services available in relation to that token.

All MiCAR crypto-asset services are potentially affected

ESMA deliberately frames the Opinion across the complete range of crypto-asset services.

The supervisory analysis therefore extends beyond trading platforms and exchange functions to execution of orders, reception and transmission of orders, placing, investment advice, portfolio management, transfer services and custody and administration. ESMA expects authorities to assess whether these activities, alone or in combination, enable European clients to acquire, exchange, trade, subscribe for, increase an existing position in, or otherwise obtain or maintain access to a non-compliant ART or EMT.

The consequence for business models is significant because many platforms separate these functions operationally.

A token may already have been removed from ordinary spot trading but remain transferable through a wallet. It may no longer be actively promoted but still be accepted as a settlement asset. It may be excluded from new purchases while remaining technically available through conversion routes, API functionality, internal transfers or portfolio products. A custody provider may not operate an exchange at all but may continue to hold the token for clients. Each such configuration now requires a separate assessment against the objective of preventing new or expanded client exposure.

Accordingly, the correct compliance exercise is not simply to ask whether a stablecoin remains “listed”. The more appropriate question is whether the totality of the CASP's technological and contractual architecture still enables the token to function as an ordinarily available product for its European clientele.

8 January 2027: legacy positions may be wound down, but not indefinitely maintained

ESMA recognises that immediate termination of every service could itself harm clients, particularly where customers already hold affected assets.

The Opinion therefore permits national supervisors to tolerate narrowly circumscribed residual functionality where necessary for an orderly exit. ESMA expressly refers to liquidation, conversion, withdrawal, transfer and safekeeping of existing positions, while excluding new acquisitions, promotion, active distribution, trading and continued market availability. Such arrangements should be temporary, clearly communicated and subject to heightened supervisory scrutiny.

This distinction is fundamental.

The Opinion does not require CASPs simply to freeze customers into positions they can no longer exit. Its underlying logic is the opposite. Legacy services may continue to the extent necessary to permit customers to leave the position without avoidable detriment, but they should not become an indirect mechanism for perpetuating ordinary commercial support for the token.

For custody in particular, the distinction deserves careful attention. Paragraph 24 of the Opinion expressly recognises safekeeping among the possible residual services, yet the concluding section concentrates upon sell-only, conversion, transfer and withdrawal functionality. The more defensible interpretation is therefore not that custody of an affected stablecoin can continue indefinitely, but that temporary safekeeping may remain permissible where it forms part of an orderly and risk-controlled exit process and does not enable new exposure or continued market availability.

ESMA expects remaining legacy exposure to be remediated as quickly as possible and, at the latest, within three months following publication of the Opinion. The FMA Liechtenstein has translated that supervisory timeframe into a concrete date of 8 January 2027 for its public communication.

From a governance perspective, firms should therefore avoid treating 8 January as the date on which implementation work begins. It is better understood as the outside horizon identified by the supervisory authorities for remediation.

A disclaimer will not solve the problem

One of the most consequential parts of the Opinion is ESMA's rejection of a disclosure-based solution.

A CASP cannot, in ESMA's view, resolve the underlying regulatory concern merely by warning the customer that the relevant stablecoin is not MiCAR-compliant, obtaining an acknowledgement or presenting additional risk disclosures before the transaction. The issuer safeguards imposed by Titles III and IV are intended to address a combination of risks relating to governance, reserves, safeguarding, disclosure, redemption and supervision, which means that the absence of those protections cannot simply be transformed into an informed-consent issue between the CASP and its customer.

That has direct consequences for terms of service and risk documentation.

Contractual provisions remain important, but they should support the operational restriction rather than replace it. A sophisticated warning followed by an unrestricted “continue” button would be difficult to reconcile with the logic of the Opinion.

Technical, contractual and organisational controls will need to work together

ESMA specifically expects CASPs to establish technical, contractual and organisational measures capable of preventing affected tokens from remaining available to European clients, including controls designed to stop customers from acquiring or increasing their exposure.

For many firms, this will require more than a front-end change.

The technical layer should reflect the firm's actual service architecture, including trading pairs, conversion functions, APIs, deposits, withdrawals, internal transfers, custody functionality, portfolio systems and any automated processes which could create or expand an affected position. The contractual layer should allow the CASP to restrict services, suspend functionality, remove assets, implement conversion or exit arrangements and communicate the consequences to customers in a legally robust manner. The organisational layer should establish a documented token review process, responsibility for classification decisions, escalation mechanisms, management approval, continuing monitoring and evidence showing how the firm determined that each supported ART or EMT satisfied the applicable requirements.

The last point may prove particularly important during supervisory review.

A CASP which simply records that a major stablecoin is “generally considered MiCA compliant” has not necessarily answered the relevant question. A defensible compliance file should identify the token, the relevant issuer, the regulatory basis upon which the asset is lawfully made available, any necessary issuer consent or other conditions, the jurisdictions concerned, the services supplied by the CASP and the evidence on which the conclusion rests.

This is precisely the type of exercise in which legal analysis, product architecture and compliance implementation must converge.

Liechtenstein CASPs should treat the Opinion as an immediate supervisory issue

Liechtenstein has implemented the MiCAR framework through its EEA MiCA Implementation Act and the earlier transitional arrangements for relevant service providers ended on 1 July 2026. The FMA has consequently moved from the transition into an environment in which MiCAR authorisation and ongoing compliance form the operative supervisory framework for affected crypto-asset services.

Against that background, the FMA's announcement of 23 October 2026 is particularly clear. It states that the authority will take the ESMA Opinion into account in its supervision.

The formal legal character of the ESMA Opinion nevertheless remains relevant. ESMA issued the document pursuant to Article 29(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 as a supervisory convergence instrument addressed primarily to national competent authorities. It is therefore analytically preferable to describe the 8 January 2027 date as a supervisory remediation expectation rather than as a new statutory deadline inserted into MiCAR.

That distinction should not, however, be mistaken for a reason to postpone implementation. Once the competent national authority has publicly confirmed that it will apply the Opinion within its supervisory work, the practical regulatory relevance for a supervised CASP is evident.

EMTs require an additional payment-law perspective

There is another issue which should not be overlooked when stablecoin business models involve EMTs.

MiCAR treats an EMT as a crypto-asset, but Article 48(2) also connects the instrument to the electronic-money framework. European regulatory guidance has further recognised that EMTs fall within the concept of electronic money and therefore “funds” for PSD2 purposes, while at the same time remaining crypto-assets when determining whether an activity constitutes a MiCAR crypto-asset service. The result is that a business model involving an EMT can raise both MiCAR and payment-services questions depending upon how settlement, collection, transmission and the relationship between the CASP, the customer, the issuer and other intermediaries are structured. (European Banking Authority, 2026).

Consequently, removing a non-compliant token from a MiCAR service does not necessarily complete the regulatory analysis, just as obtaining a CASP authorisation does not automatically authorise every payment-related function surrounding an EMT.

For firms designing stablecoin payment, exchange or settlement structures, the regulatory perimeter should therefore be mapped function by function rather than licence by licence.

What CASPs should do now

For an authorised CASP, the most effective response is to treat the Opinion as a product-governance and regulatory-remediation exercise rather than merely a legal memorandum.

The starting point should be a complete inventory of every ART and EMT to which the firm's services provide direct or indirect access, followed by a documented assessment of the issuer and the legal basis upon which each token may lawfully be offered or admitted to trading within the relevant market. That assessment should then be mapped against each MiCAR service performed by the CASP, including functionality that may not be visible in the ordinary trading interface.

Where the compliance basis cannot be established, the firm should determine which functions must cease, which residual functions are necessary to protect existing clients, how those functions will be technically restricted and for what period, how clients will be informed, whether contractual amendments are necessary, and how the entire decision and implementation process will be evidenced for supervisory purposes.

Particular attention should be paid to situations in which the CASP relies upon another regulated entity, such as a custodian, liquidity provider, payment institution or e-money institution. Outsourcing or allocating part of the operating chain to another firm does not itself answer whether the CASP's own service continues to facilitate access to the affected token. The precise allocation of regulated activities and responsibilities must therefore be reflected in both the operating model and the contractual documentation.

The implications extend beyond CASPs to stablecoin issuers

The October Opinion is equally significant for issuers because it strengthens the commercial consequences of non-compliance.

MiCAR's issuer rules become materially more effective when authorised CASPs cannot provide normal market access to tokens that fail to satisfy them. Even where a stablecoin continues to circulate globally, its usefulness to European users can decline substantially if regulated exchanges, custodians and other intermediaries are required to withdraw ordinary service functionality.

For international stablecoin projects, the European regulatory strategy should therefore be considered at issuer level before distribution arrangements are developed. Questions concerning token classification, issuer status, authorisation, white paper requirements, redemption rights, reserve structures, distribution consent, CASP integration and, in the case of EMTs, the interaction with electronic-money and payment-services regulation should be resolved as a coherent regulatory architecture rather than as separate afterthoughts.

That is also the broader policy logic behind ESMA's Opinion. MiCAR would lose much of its practical effect if non-compliant issuers could continue reaching European customers through fully regulated CASPs despite not themselves providing the safeguards which Titles III and IV require.

How Bergt Law can assist

Bergt Law advises crypto-asset service providers, token issuers, fintech companies and regulated financial institutions on MiCAR authorisation, stablecoin and token classification, regulatory product structuring, CASP business models, payment-services questions, contractual implementation and proceedings before the Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein.

In light of the 8 January 2027 remediation horizon, CASPs supporting ARTs or EMTs should now review both their token inventory and the actual functionality through which customers can obtain, maintain or increase exposure. Where uncertainties exist, the relevant issuer status, service classification and remediation architecture should be clarified before restrictions have to be implemented under supervisory pressure.

Key findings

• ESMA's October 2026 Opinion materially expands the supervisory approach to non-MiCA-compliant stablecoins. The issue is no longer confined to whether a CASP's activity itself constitutes an offer to the public or admission to trading.

• The Opinion potentially affects every MiCAR crypto-asset service, including trading, exchange, execution, order transmission, placing, advice, portfolio management, transfers and custody.

• The decisive test is functional. CASPs should examine whether their services enable European clients to acquire, increase, access or maintain exposure to a non-compliant ART or EMT.

• Existing positions may be supported only through narrowly limited wind-down functionality. Liquidation, conversion, withdrawal, transfer and, where justified, temporary safekeeping may remain possible where necessary to protect existing customers.

• 8 January 2027 is the critical remediation horizon for Liechtenstein. The FMA has expressly announced that it will take the ESMA Opinion into account in its supervisory practice.

• Customer warnings and acknowledgements are insufficient. ESMA considers issuer-level MiCAR safeguards incapable of being replaced by disclosure alone.

• CASPs require effective technical, contractual and organisational controls, supported by documented token-specific compliance assessments and demonstrable governance.

• A token's global availability does not establish its regulatory availability within Europe. Each ART and EMT requires an assessment of the issuer and the applicable Title III or Title IV requirements.

• EMTs may create an additional payment-services perimeter. MiCAR compliance should therefore be analysed together with applicable electronic-money and PSD2 requirements where the business model involves payment or settlement functions.

• Stablecoin issuers are also directly affected in commercial terms. Tokens that do not satisfy the relevant MiCAR regime risk losing access to regulated European distribution, custody and liquidity infrastructure.

References

European Banking Authority. (2026). Qualification of crypto-asset service in case of exchange of electronic money tokens for other crypto-assets, Q&A 2024_7084.

European Commission. (2025, January 17). Scope of public offering, ESMA Q&A 2404.

European Parliament and Council. (2023). Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets. Official Journal of the European Union.

European Securities and Markets Authority. (2025, January 17). Statement on the provision of certain crypto-asset services in relation to non-MiCA compliant ARTs and EMTs, ESMA75-223375936-6099.

European Securities and Markets Authority. (2026, October 8). Opinion on the provision of crypto asset services in relation to non-MiCA-compliant asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens, ESMA75-113276571-1742.

Financial Market Authority Liechtenstein. (2026, October 23). ESMA-Opinion zum Umgang mit nicht MiCAR-konformen Stablecoins.

This publication provides general information and does not constitute legal advice. The regulatory treatment of a crypto-asset and the services provided in relation to it depends upon the individual token, issuer, service model and jurisdictions concerned.